The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Issue 3 by Cavan, Susan et al.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy The ISCIP Analyst
2006-03-17
The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Issue
3
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/11814
Boston University
 1 
THE ISCIP ANALYST 
Volume 12, Number 3 (March 17, 2006) 
 
Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Succession haunts policy 
One of the hallmarks of the Yel'tsin presidency was the frequency of the 
president's absences from the Kremlin:  Beginning shortly after the August 1991 
coup and continuing through both his terms, Yel'tsin had an unsettling habit of 
disappearing from view just when his firm leadership seemed most necessary.  
On a few occasions, Yel'tsin's absences revealed the bitterness of the struggles 
going on under the Kremlin carpets.  Within hours of his departure "on vacation," 
scores of decrees over Yel'tsin's "signature" would be published. (1) On 
occasion, the decrees would redistribute Kremlin authority and set up duplicate 
bodies in complete contradiction to previous decrees, revealing more about the 
relative status of the apparatchiks than the president's policy preferences. (2) 
 
The jibs and tacks of Putin's recent policy decisions likewise may provide more 
insight into the Kremlin succession struggles than true changes of course in 
policy.  At least, that possibility is clearly at the forefront of heightened journalistic 
instincts when assessing recent personnel decisions.  Thus, Dmitri Medvedev 
and Sergei Ivanov have been installed as Putin's first tier successors; Dmitri 
Kozak was banished to the Caucasus (by a devious Sechin?) to prevent his 
influence in the succession struggle, and then further marginalized in the recent 
transfer of anti-terrorism authority to Nikolai Patrushev (See Security Services 
below).  
 
The relative influence of Putin's key advisers is certainly an issue of crucial 
importance, especially now when policy-making is at perhaps its most opaque in 
recent Russian history.  In particular, the collective status of the siloviki (if they 
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can, in fact, be viewed collectively) appears on the rise, but their policy goals 
remain vague:  most analyses assume this group adheres to a strongly centrist, 
nationalist-tinted, western-eschewing ideology.  In many ways, they are seen as 
fitting into the slavophile tradition of Russian history:  Looking less to the west as 
a model of development than to the east, or more often, internally—as in the 
Third Rome or Third Way. 
 
While the conventional division within the Putin administration is viewed as liberal 
versus siloviki, in the case of the "liberal" branch, the contrasting moniker to 
slavophile – the westernizers – really does seem more apt.  The focus of the 
liberal, reformist (economically at least) wing is integration into the primarily 
western economic system and often, attendant integration into political and 
military organizations as well.  
 
Interestingly this year, some of the key international events at which westernizers 
traditionally have been well-represented, such as the Economic Forum in Davos, 
Switzerland, were sparsely attended by Russian political leaders.  Even the 
composition of the Russian delegation at Davos, which was headed by a stalwart 
of the liberal faction, German Gref, was the subject of controversy, as higher-
level officials either chose to, or were ordered to, stay away. (3) 
 
Clearly, questions of economic integration and foreign investment—two 
mainstays of Davos discussions—are central policy issues for the Russian 
government, and the absence of the Prime Minister, President or a power name 
stand-in at this event alone speaks volumes.  Perhaps more importantly is the 
power play that prevented a major force to stay away:  Finance Minister Aleksei 
Kudrin was forbidden from traveling to the event by the Prime Minister.  This 
suggests either turmoil within the government over who should represent 
Russia's interests abroad (or perhaps, whom the PM finds a more trustworthy 
representative), or a publicly-played scene in the succession drama. (4) 
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Kudrin, who generally has excellent access to the President, makes the short list 
of potential successors.  Keeping him from heightening his public profile abroad 
may have been a shrewd ploy in the internal struggle.  Its implications for actual 
policy, particularly its impact on foreign investment however, could be seriously 
detrimental.  
 
This succession struggle, where policy plays second fiddle to personnel, strikes 
at a difficult time for Russia:  Its chairmanship of the G-8 should have highlighted 
the re-emergence of Russian international leadership.  Instead, issues where 
westernizer/slavophile struggles seem to have significant weight, such as the 
continuing Iranian nuclear program (where "western-liberal" Kiriyenko was 
suddenly installed to oversee traditionally "siloviki" affairs) have been allowed to 
overshadow clear Russian policy successes. This is not yet another argument for 
changing the constitution to allow Putin to remain in office, but rather raises the 
question of whether Putin currently is strong enough to end the succession 
games and refocus his government on national priorities.  Thus far, the creation 
of a council, the Public Chamber, and its assignment with tasks that duplicate the 
goals of the government (national priorities) suggest that Putin has given over his 
government to the personnel battle royale.  (5) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) "Yel'tsin signs 81 decrees and directives during his first week of leave," ITAR-
TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in English 0858 GMT 22 Mar 94 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) See The ISCIP Analyst, 16 Feb 06, Russian Federation: Executive Branch by 
Susan J. Cavan via www.bu.edu/iscip for a discussion of other uses for the 
creation of duplicative councils. 
(3) Interview with Lilia Shevtsova, 2 Feb 06, Novaya gazeta, no. 7; Federal News 
Service via Leis-Nexis. 
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(4) Not going to Davos; Aleksei Kudrin will not talk to his G-8 counterparts, 20 
Jan 06, Vedomosti; What the Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) See The ISCIP Analyst, 16 Feb 06, Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By John Kafer 
 
FSB again leads anti-terrorism effort 
Last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a decree establishing the 
National Anti-Terrorism Committee and appointed Federal Security Services 
(FSB) Director, Nikolai Patrushev, as its chairman. (1)  This is not the first time 
FSB was placed in charge of anti-terrorism efforts; Russia’s leadership seems to 
alternate between the Interior Ministry (MVD) and FSB taking lead on anti-
terrorism efforts. 
  
In 1997, the Interdepartmental Anti-Terrorism Commission was established to 
coordinate the organs of executive power in the fight against terrorism.  It 
consisted of FSB, MVD, Ministry of Defense, Federal Government 
Communication Agency (FAPSI, later incorporated into FSB), the General 
Prosecutors Office, and the Federal Border Guard Service (later incorporated 
into FSB).  The Commission was chaired by the Prime Minister, but in his 
absence, by the head of the FSB, which served to place the FSB above the other 
agencies. (2)  Of course, this was prior to the US declared Global War on 
Terrorism and the associated increased emphasis on anti-terrorism efforts in 
Russia.    
  
At the more operational and tactical level, Russia established Tactical Command 
Teams in the Southern Federal Region in 2004, headed by an Internal Troops 
Colonel.  The teams include “united forces” with units from the Internal Troops, 
MVD special forces (OMON), Ministry of Defense (MOD), Civilian Defense and 
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Emergency Ministry.  During terrorist situations, the Tactical Command Team 
commander becomes “head of the operational headquarters wielding power to 
make decisions without consultations with Moscow.” (3)  Noticeably absent from 
the organization are FSB personnel.  However, during actual terrorist situations, 
FSB personnel assumed leadership instead of the designated Tactical Command 
Teams. (4) 
  
In February 2005, the FSB was placed in charge of counter-terrorism efforts in 
the Southern Federal District.  As part of this effort, FSB regional directorates 
would command operational headquarters in order to improve integration and 
coordination between different agencies, particularly with the MVD. (5)  Then, in 
July 2005, President Putin, specifically referring to counter-terrorism efforts in the 
Caucasus, emphasized that “the Interior Ministry remains the leading agency in 
dealing with terrorism” and “Tactical Command Teams were established last 
year,” headed by MVD officers, tasked with “coordination between security 
agencies." (6)  
  
New National Anti-Terrorism Committee powers 
Evidently, President Putin is not satisfied with the MVD leading anti-terrorism 
efforts.  The decree that establishes the new, FSB-led National Anti-Terrorism 
Commission states that it will include the most senior officials from all security 
and law enforcement agencies, special services, key ministries, and both houses 
of parliament, and authorizes 300 extra staff for the FSB head office.  The 
commission’s federal operations headquarters will include heads of the MVD, 
MOD, and Emergency Ministry, all subordinate to the headquarters’ leader, a 
senior FSB official to be appointed by the FSB director.  Additionally, the 
commission will have regional headquarters, with a chief appointed by regional 
FSB directorates. (7)    
  
The National Anti-Terrorism Committee will have “unprecedented powers” with 
decisions “binding for all federal government bodies.  Directives from the 
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commission or operations headquarters will be binding on local government 
bodies, and the commission will request and receive materials and information it 
requires from federal or regional authorities as well as non-governmental 
organizations. (8) 
  
FSB resembling KGB? 
In recent years, FSB actions increasingly seem to resemble the behavior of the 
Soviet KGB.  The case of the British diplomat accused of espionage and links to 
non-governmental organizations supporting democratic reforms is the most 
recent example.  There is also evidence of FSB doing “dirty work” in states 
outside of Russia, shutting down opposition web sites in Kazakhstan and 
assisting Uzbekistan’s round up suspects following the Andijan massacre.  
Nearer to home, the FSB is often at the center of human rights complaints over 
persons vanishing in the rebellious Caucasus region. (9) 
  
The FSB may be extending its tentacles into the military as well.  In a recent 
interview, FSB Director, Nikolai Patrushev answered a question about the FSB’s 
counter-intelligence role in the Armed Forces.  As part of his answer, he stated 
that “military counter-intelligence is part of the FSB” and “counter-intelligence 
agents work directly in units and subdivisions of the Army and Navy…” (10)  He 
makes no mention of the General Staff’s Main Intelligence Department (GRU) 
role in military counter-intelligence, leaving unanswered the issue of GRU’s 
status. 
 
Summary 
Not surprisingly, Russia’s leadership has appointed once again the FSB to lead 
the National Anti-terrorism Commission.  There is little doubt this will do more to 
further centralize control in the regions and over non-governmental 
organizations, than it will serve to improve anti-terrorism efforts.  The new FSB-
led National Anti-terrorism Committee, however, is not likely to solve the 
coordination problems that have plagued Russia’s security forces during crises.  
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Although the departments may meet at the strategic level, the various security 
apparatuses are not likely to integrate and professionalize their forces or 
command and control mechanisms sufficiently to solve coordination problems.  
Additionally, the MVD and MOD likely are not pleased with the FSB’s increased 
reach into the security affairs formerly in their domains, and therefore are not 
likely to increase cooperation. 
  
On the contrary, responsibility for failure to prevent a future terrorist attack and/or 
respond appropriately will now fall squarely on the shoulders of the FSB.  Indeed, 
the decree states that “efficient leadership in crisis situations will be the 
responsibility of regional FSB chiefs, and ultimately FSB Director” and the “head 
of state is not accountable for terrorism, since he isn’t a member of the National 
Anti-terrorism Committee.” (11)  It appears President Putin has been more 
proactive in distancing himself from the next security failure.  Of course, there is 
plenty of room for Patrushev to then push responsibility to the regional FSB 
chiefs, who, clearly, are hoping that a crisis does not present itself it their area of 
responsibility on their watch.  
  
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “A Hierarchical Security Service,” Kommersant, 17 Feb 06, What the Papers 
Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis.     
(2) “The Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation” by Gordon Bennett, 
Conflict Studies Research Center, March 2000.  
(3)  “Rapid Reorganization Force,” by Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, 
Novaya gazeta, 5 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis.   
(4) The ISCIP Analyst, Vol XII, Number 1, 27 Jan 06. 
(5) “The FSB Will Be Placed In Charge” by Natalia Gorodetskaya, Kommersant, 
24 Feb 05, WPS via ISI Emerging Markets. 
(6) “Firing the First Shot” by Alexei Nikolsky, Vedomosti, 28 Jul 05, WPS via ISI 
Emerging Markets. 
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(7) “A Hierarchical Security Service,” Ibid. 
(8) “A Hierarchical Security Service,” Ibid. 
(9) “A Chill in the Moscow Air” by Owen Matthews and Anna Nemtsova, 
Newsweek International, 6 Feb 06 via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Military Counter-Intelligence: Overt Use of Covert Victories” by Mikhail 
Shevtsov, Argumenty i Fakty, No. 8, 22 Feb 06, WPS via Lexis-Nexis.  
(11) “A Hierarchical Security Service,” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Marisa Payne 
 
Crimes against Milosevic? 
While many leaders around the world silently accepted the death of Slobodan 
Milosevic, the ex-Serbian leader who was standing trial at The Hague for crimes 
against humanity, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov voiced his regret. In 
the Russian government’s first official statement regarding the death of Milosevic, 
the charges against whom included genocide and war crimes, Lavrov told a 
woeful tale: 
 
“Slobodan Milosevic had asked to be treated in Russia because of the 
deterioration of his state of health…Russian doctors were prepared to give him 
the necessary aid and the Russian authorities guaranteed to meet all the 
demands of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY)…Unfortunately, in spite of our guarantees, the tribunal did not agree to 
give Slobodan Milosevic the possibility of being treated in Russia.” (1). 
 
As days passed, Russia’s resentment of the Tribunal’s February decision not to 
allow Milosevic to travel to Russia, despite a “100 percent state guarantee” that 
he would return for the remainder of his trial, turned to outrage and suspicion. 
Stating that he was “disturbed” by the decision not to allow Milosevic’s Russian 
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treatment, Lavrov concluded that Milosevic was not allowed to seek treatment for 
his heart and high blood pressure because The Hague “didn’t believe Russia.” 
He continued, “In a situation where we weren’t believed, we also have the right 
not to believe and not to trust those who are conducting this autopsy.” (2) 
 
Now, in an effort to regain the pride lost in their perceived slight by The Hague 
and amid speculation of a possible poisoning of Milosevic, Lavrov demanded that 
Russian officials “take part in the autopsy or at least acquaint themselves with it.” 
(3) 
 
It is understandable that Russia is intent on making its voice heard regarding 
Milosevic, his trial and his death. Russia claims a long historical connection with 
Serbia, stemming from their similarities in population—both have largely Slavic 
and Orthodox peoples. Russia also strongly opposed the NATO bombing of 
Serbia in 1999. Even during the trial and despite the files of evidence against 
Milosevic, Russia remained a supporter of both Milosevic and Serbian actions. 
While introducing a Russian cardiologist to discuss Milosevic’s heart condition, a 
presenter on Kremlin-backed Channel 1, introduced him two ways: “Slobodan 
Milosevic has taken his place in history. For some he was a war criminal, while 
for others a symbol of resistance to foreign diktat.” (4) Perhaps even more 
revealing were the 300 people who protested The Hague’s decision with posters 
and banners reading “The Hague is a Factory of Death.” (5) 
 
While many, including former prime minister and current Putin favorite Yevgeni 
Primakov, who lamented Milosevic’s death as a “personal loss,” (6) perpetuate 
the image of Milosevic as a committed Serbian nationalist, some in Russia 
dispute the official government line. Valeria Novodvorskaya, of the Democratic 
Union party, referred to her government’s treatment of the situation as “totally 
absurd,” stating on Echo Moskvy radio that Milosevic’s reasons for wanting to 
come to Russia went far beyond his medical condition: “He didn’t want to come 
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here to get better but to escape from his responsibilities in front of the Hague 
tribunal.”(7) 
 
Algerian debt-for-arms swap meet 
On March 10 President Vladimir Putin became the first Russian leader to visit 
Algeria, but the agreements he made with the country are nothing new. In the 
wake of a recent debt-for-arms swap with Syria, Putin, again, is implementing 
such a policy, this time with Algeria. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov 
signed the agreement to write off Algeria’s US$4.737 billion debt, which has been 
accumulating for decades, since the Soviet Union began exporting arms to the 
country. (8) Russia then wasted no time making another enormous arms deal. 
Algeria is set to pay $7.5 billion—the price for Russia’s largest cache of arms 
contracts since the implosion of the Soviet Union (9)—for new weapons and 
warplanes, according to documents signed by Lavrov. (10) 
 
Will Algeria be able to pay Russia for these arms? If they could not pay their 
debt, which was some $3 billion less than the new deal, it seems unlikely that the 
$7.5 billion will likely to be recovered. 
 
But Putin’s interest in Algeria extends further than the latest arms deal, which 
makes Algeria Russia’s third-largest arms customer. (11) Since 2001, the 
countries have developed a “strategic partnership.” While talking for several 
hours in Algiers, Putin and Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika agreed to 
deepen that partnership by promoting Russian companies in the Algerian 
marketplace. Putin stated, “A number of our companies are ready to work in the 
Algerian market.” Lavrov agreed, contending that Russia and Algeria have “a 
mutual interest in working together and coordinating their efforts on world 
markets.” (12) 
 
Despite the rhetorical promotion of the private sector, Putin has promised, at 
least on the part of Russia, that the government will keep a close watch over 
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Russian-Algerian activities: “We need to ensure that the government keeps 
check on the implementation of these contracts and makes sure that no 
problems arise in the work on our side.” (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Russia regrets Milosevic not allowed to receive treatment in Moscow,” 11 
Mar 06, Agence France Presse via JRL 2006 #62. 
(2) “Russian foreign minister: Moscow doesn’t trust Milosevic’s autopsy,” 13 Mar 
06, Associated Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Prominent Russian cardiologist describes Milosevic's condition,” Channel 1, 
11 Mar 06, BBC Monitoring via JRL 2006 #62. 
(5) “Moscow Rallies to Defend Milosevic,” 14 Mar 06, The Moscow Times via 
www.themoscowtimes.com. 
(6) “Former Russian PM pays tribute to Milosevic, blames Hague tribunal for 
death,” RTR Russian TV, 11 Mar 06, BBC Monitoring via JRL 2006 #62. 
(7) “Russia regrets Milosevic not allowed to receive treatment in Moscow,” 11 
Mar 06, Agence France Presse via JRL 2006 #62. 
(8) “Russia writes off Algeria’s $4.737 billion debt,” 10 Mar 06, Prime-Tass via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(9) “MIG JETS INSTEAD OF DEBTS; Putin returns with $7.5 billion in defense 
orders,” Vedomosti, 13 Mar 06, What Papers Say (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis, 
Translated by Elena Leonova. 
(10) “Russia, Algeria sign debt, warplanes deals on Putin visit,” 10 Mar 06, 
Agence France Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
(11) “MIG JETS INSTEAD OF DEBTS; Putin returns with $7.5 billion in defense 
orders,” 13 Mar 06, What Papers Say via Lexis-Nexis, Translated by Elena 
Leonova. 
(12) “Russia, Algeria sign debt, warplanes deals on Putin visit,” 10 Mar 06, 
Agence France Press via Lexis-Nexis. 
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(13) Extracts from Transcript of Meeting with the Government Cabinet, 13 Mar 06 
via www.kremlin.ru 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Robyn Angley 
 
The Fascist specter 
Manipulation of the fear of fascism is a rapidly growing political tool in 
contemporary Russian politics. The most recent evidence is the so called “Anti-
Fascist Pact,” which purports to fight extremism and nationalism, and was signed 
on 20 February by United Russia, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), Union of 
Right Forces (SPS), the Agrarian Party, Pensioners' Party, United Socialist Party 
of Russia, Democratic Party of Russia, People's Patriotic Party of Russia, United 
Industrial Party of Russia, Party for Peace and Unity and Free Russia Party. (1)  
Parties that refused to sign included the Communist Party, Yabloko, and Rodina 
(Motherland). The pact was signed during a ceremony in which members of 
United Russia and LDPR called for the exclusion from politics of the parties that 
did not sign the agreement. 
 
In light of the utility of the specter of fascism as a popular political threat, the 
participation of fascist groups in the 23 February Defender of the Fatherland Day 
parade can only aggravate the growing polarization of political parties. Ironically, 
the holiday celebrating the Soviet triumph over fascism was marked by some 
with fascist salutes, nationalistic slogans, and the presence of neo-Nazi 
demonstrators. (2)  The Public Chamber condemned the participation of fascist 
groups and called for a “legal inquiry” into the matter. (3)   
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Nikita Belykh, leader of SPS, sees the fascist specter as a political ploy to raise 
support for United Russia in the next national elections. “Today, the government 
needs fascists to make the electorate choose between simple things in 2007-
2008: black or white, insiders or outsiders, ‘the pro-Kremlin party’ or ‘fascists,’” 
said Belykh. (4) 
 
United Russia and religion in the media 
Members of United Russia, the party devoted to giving Putin a pliant legislature, 
have adopted an interesting cause in the wake of the Danish cartoon scandal 
that insulted Muslims and raised questions about the limits of free speech and 
tact. In February, Abdul-Khakim Sutygov, United Russia’s religious liaison and 
coordinator for nationalities policy, urged Russian media to take the lead in 
formulating an international “journalists’ code precluding the possibility of 
insulting religious symbols, sacred things and believers’ feelings,” (5) an 
optimistic if naive notion. Now, however, one local branch of United Russia has 
taken an even more innovative approach to religion in the media. Rather than 
waiting for the outcries of a religious constituency and then reacting to potentially 
offensive religious content in the media, the Volgograd United Russia chapter 
has stepped into the vanguard of protecting religious sensibility. The problem is 
that no one was offended. 
 
 Gorodskiye vesti, a Volgograd daily paper, was shut down in mid-February by 
the mayor’s office for printing a religious cartoon. Nash Region Plus was shut 
down shortly afterwards for reprinting the cartoon. The sketch depicted Jesus 
Christ, Moses, Buddha and Mohammed watching TV. On the TV screen, two 
clusters of people were getting ready to fight. The caption said, “We’ve never 
taught them to do things like that.” (6)  Outcry over the article did not come from 
religious organizations, but instead was spearheaded by the local branch of 
United Russia; Religious groups in the area did not see anything to raise a fuss 
about. The closure of the two newspapers raises the question of how political 
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parties use their organizational abilities and clout to influence, and possibly 
intimidate, inconvenient media. 
 
Far East immigration 
The widely feared and predicted resettlement of Chinese migrants on a mass 
scale in the Russian Far East has not taken place, in part due to visa limitations 
and border controls imposed by the Russian government. The Russian Far East, 
in particular Khabarovsk Krai and Primorskii Krai, was seen in the 1990s as 
being particularly vulnerable to a mass influx of Chinese immigrants. The region 
has a birth rate that is even lower than the (already low) Russian national birth 
rate. The birth rate combines with internal migration towards western Russia to 
yield a declining population and labor shortage in the region. These factors 
exacerbate the perception of mass Chinese immigration as menacing for many 
Russians and has produced some political rhetoric that fans the fear of being 
outnumbered by Chinese migrants.  
 
The fear of a mass inflow of Chinese migrants stemmed in part from flourishing 
border activity in 1992-1993, when Chinese businessmen could cross the border 
into Russia without a visa, and Chinese imports and exports dominated the 
region’s economy. Visa regulations were instituted again in January 1994; the 
restrictions helped control the cross border flow of workers. Russia also has 
placed restrictions on tourist visas, limiting the amount of time that tourist groups 
can visit Russia and placing restrictions on where they can stay. In theory, these 
restrictions help control tourist activity and the activities of businessmen who 
come in to Russia using tourist visas, which are cheaper than the commercial 
visas required to conduct business in the region. In reality, the practice has 
helped set up a source of regular income for corrupt law enforcement officials, 
who accept bribes in return for extending the length of the tourist visa. (6)  
Nonetheless, the restrictions do seem to be slowing the rate of Chinese 
migration. In 1992-1993, the peak of Sino-Russian border trade, an estimated 
50,000-80,000 Chinese citizens worked the region. (7)  As of 2000, it was 
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estimated that a maximum of 40,000 Chinese worked in Khabarovsk Krai and 
Primorskii Krai. (8) 
 
The primary motivation for the current Chinese migration seems to lie in contract 
work and cross-border trade rather than in a desire for permanent immigration to 
Russia. Many Chinese migrants maintain close ties to their families in China, 
thus strengthening the desire to engage in only temporary migration to Russia. 
However, the growing economic ties between the two nations probably will result 
in increased cross-border traffic between Russia and China. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Party leaders sign anti-fascist pact,” Moscow Times, 21 Feb 06 via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(2) “The ‘Browns’ march on a ‘Red’ day,” What the Papers Say (WPS), 27 Feb 06 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) “Russian advisory body wants parties punished for nationalist rallies,” Itar-
Tass, 26 Feb 06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis. 
(4) “Special purpose Nazis,” Noviye izvestia, 6 Mar 06; RusData Dialine via 
Lexis-Nexis. 
(5) “United Russia suggests journalists code,” Itar-Tass, 7 Feb 06 via WNC; FBIS 
transcribed text. 
(6) “Danish caricature row keeps rebounding on Russian media,” Itar-Tass, 10 
Mar 06; FBIS transcribed text via WNC. 
(7) Elizabeth Wishnick, “The securitization of Chinese migration to the Russian 
Far East: Rhetoric and reality,” http://www.idss-
nts.org/PDF/Elizabeth_Wishnick.pdf, p. 11. 
(8) Galina Vitkovskaia and Zhanna Zaonchkovskaia, Novaia Stolypinskaia 
politika na Dal’nem Vostoke Rossii, [New Stolypin Policy in the Russian Far East] 
in Galina Vitkovskaia and Dmitri Trenin, Perspektivy Dal’nevostochnogo regiona: 
mezhstranovye vzaimosdeistviia, [Perspectives on the Far Eastern Region: 
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Interstate Interactions], Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 1999, p. 84, as cited 
in Wishnick, p. 4. 
(9) Vilya G. Gelbras, Kitaiskaya real’nost’ Rossii [Russia’s Chinese Reality], 
Moscow: Muravei, 2001, p. 39, as cited in Wishnick, p. 4. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Marcel LeBlanc and Jeffrey Butler 
 
INTERNAL 
Retreat from treaties? 
Russian leaders are threatening to back away from long-standing treaties that 
have been instrumental to European stability for much of the past two decades.  
Over the past year, key Russian figures such as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, 
Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, and Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, Chief of the 
General Staff, have voiced displeasure with the failure of the West to ratify the 
amended Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.  This dissatisfaction 
increasingly is finding voice in Russian threats to back out of the treaty.  More 
recently, Russian rhetoric has expanded to include thoughts of abrogating the 
1987 intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty.  
 
Moscow publicly is questioning NATO motives behind delayed ratification of the 
updated CFE Treaty while NATO continues to expand its membership and 
influence in Eastern Europe.  The CFE Treaty was originally signed in 1990 to 
limit NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces.  The Treaty was amended in 
1999 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact.  The 
updated treaty specifies troop and armament limits by country but will not go into 
effect until all 30 parties have ratified the agreement. (1)  At present, only 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine have ratified the new treaty.  NATO 
nations have not ratified the agreement and are not likely to do so until Russian 
forces withdraw from Moldova and Georgia. (2)  Russia does not consider this 
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sufficient justification, as illustrated by Lavrov’s statement at last December’s 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) meeting, “If steps 
are not taken to ratify [the adapted CFE Treaty] in the very near future, we will be 
in danger of losing the whole regime of control over conventional arms in 
Europe.” (3)  Moreover, Lavrov dismissed NATO’s reasons for not ratifying the 
treaty as “far-fetched pretexts.” (4) 
 
Russia claims that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe exacerbates its 
suspicions.  The most recent is the US–Romanian agreement allowing 
permanent basing of US troops, which is the first such arrangement with a former 
Warsaw Pact member.  US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice signed the 6 
Dec 2005 agreement that initially will host 1,500 US troops as part of a new 
Eastern European Task Force. (5)  The US has attempted to mollify Russian 
concerns, while confirming the legitimacy of such agreements, “The agreement 
signed yesterday (6 Dec 05) is not only completely consistent with CFE 
obligations, it is also consistent with every declaration and every understanding 
that NATO has ever made with Russia." (6) 
 
Russia’s public response to the US basing agreement was swift and direct.  One 
day after the agreement was signed, Ivanov stated, “the expansion of NATO and 
US installations up to Russia's borders calls into question the future of the treaty.  
Russia currently is fulfilling all its obligations under the treaty. But if we see that 
the other countries are ignoring it, we draw conclusions from that." (7)  More 
recently, Russian Deputy Chief of Staff General Aleksandr Skvortsov opined that 
"the CFE Treaty has lost all its value following two eastwards expansions by 
NATO." (8)  Gen. Baluyevsky also suggested that NATO’s delay in ratifying the 
updated CFE Treaty is motivated by a desire to ease the political restrictions in 
basing US troops in Bulgaria and Romania. (9) 
 
The CFE Treaty is scheduled for a five year review in May, and the approach of 
this event likely will bring intensified NATO demands for Russian withdrawal from 
 18 
Moldova and Georgia with reciprocal Russian demands for reduced Western 
meddling in its former satellite states. 
 
While the bickering over the CFE Treaty is par for the course, Russian musings 
on possibly withdrawing from the INF Treaty are unexpected.  Ivanov surprised 
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with this suggestion a year ago, but 
no further public discussion ensued. (10)  More recently, General Vladimir 
Vasilenko, the head of the Russian Defense Ministry's Research Institute, 
indicated that “Russia could consider the redeployment of intermediate-range, 
nuclear-capable missiles that were scrapped under the 1987 treaty.” (11)  Gen. 
Vasilenko confirmed that he was quoted correctly and suggested that Russia had 
several reasons for considering redeployment of IRBMs “including the defense 
sector's interest in boosting the volume of state arms procurement.” (12)  
 
These statements are somewhat surprising in that Russia appears to have little 
to gain by deploying IRBMs.  Renewed production of IRBMs would signify a 
substantial reversal to disarmament trends and is likely to incur the wrath of 
Europe, China, and the US.  Since 1987, all nations with the exception of China 
have dismantled their IRBM (3000 – 5000 km range) class missiles.  This 
represents a 97% reduction from just under 800 missiles globally to China’s 20. 
(13)  More nations possess shorter range (<3000 km) missiles, but there is no 
significant increase in the missile threat to Russia. (14)  Moreover, while the 
IRBM missiles can hold European capitals hostage, they do not have the range 
to threaten the US mainland unlike Russia’s ICBMs which can target any nation.  
In addition, these missiles will provide little relief against the country’s primary 
threats, as highlighted by Ariel Cohen, senior research fellow at the Heritage 
Foundation. "Any increase in tactical or intermediate-range nuclear weapons is 
not going to help Russia fight Islamic radicals, ethnic conflicts, and other 
insurgencies." (15)  
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There are a few plausible reasons for Russia to reconsider IRBMs but these are 
not compelling.  First, this could be a response to US missile defense plans.  The 
US plans to locate a third missile defense interceptor site in Europe to 
complement the existing sites in Alaska and California.  Poland and Ukraine are 
among several countries under consideration.  Russian IRBMs such as the SS-
20 would provide a significant challenge to the fledgling US missile defense 
system due to their mobility, quick burning solid-fuel rockets, low-trajectories, and 
short time of flight.  However, Russia’s ICBM force is quite capable of 
overcoming the US missile defense system, and Russia has touted boldly the 
missile defense evading characteristics of its new Topol-M and Bulava missiles.  
Moreover, the US missile defense system is not designed to handle sophisticated 
ballistic missiles such as those possessed by Russia.  Consequently, there’s little 
for Russia to fear from the US missile defense system.  A second possible 
motivation is to resuscitate the Russian ballistic missile industry in anticipation of 
an arms race; however, proliferation of IRBM technology would be resisted by 
the Missile Technology Control Regime and certainly not tolerated by the US or 
Europe.  Thus, it is not clear why Russia would overtly pursue new IRBMs. 
 
Single aircraft industry 
Russia initiated a significant reform in its aviation industry with a move to 
consolidate the major aircraft companies under a single entity, with majority 
state-ownership.  On 21 February, President Putin signed a decree establishing 
the United Aircraft-Building Corporation.  As stated on the Russian Presidential 
website: 
 
The Corporation is created with a view to preserve and develop the research and 
production potential of the Russian aviation construction industry, to ensure the 
state's security and defence capabilities, to pool the intellectual, industrial and 
financial resources for implementing prospective programmes to create technical 
equipment used in aviation. (16) 
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The United Aircraft-Building Corporation will combine Sukhoi, MIG, Tupolev, 
Irkut, Ilyushin and Yakovlev under one authority. (17)  Furthermore, Russia plans 
to focus its industry on specific niche markets (regional, military, and transport) 
and is withdrawing from the wide-body passenger jet business, after the failure of 
the Ilyushin 96 that was not able to compete with Boeing and Airbus. (18)  The 
plight of the Russian aircraft industry was highlighted when the president of 
Ilyushin was fired after President Putin’s plane broke down in Finland and he had 
to fly home on a different plane. (19)  The decree mandates that the state will 
own no less than 75 percent of the corporation, and the merger is expected to 
take a year to complete.  
 
The aircraft industry merger is the latest Russian consolidation of a major 
industry under state control following the Yukos affair and the rise of state-
dominated Gazprom.  The consolidation is a reasonable step to help the failing 
Russian aircraft industry much as European governments support Airbus.  
Russia is also wise to focus on niche sectors as the lucrative wide body 
commercial market is dominated by Boeing and Airbus, providing little hope that 
Russia could catch up for many years.  Russia is far more likely to find a 
meaningful role in the regional jet, military, and transport markets.  The Russian 
government also is targeting the auto and mining industries for increased state-
ownership and management. (20) 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) Wade Baise, “Russia ,West Clash over Troop Pullouts,” Arms Control Today, 
Jan/Feb 20, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/ . 
(2) “Ivanov: Moscow May Reconsider Arms Control Treaty,” Voice of America 
News, 7 Dec 05 via Lexis-Nexis. 
(3) Baise, Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
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EXTERNAL 
Russia uses its military footprint to counter the West 
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Russia lately has made some subtle and some not-so-subtle strategic decisions 
regarding its military forces and equipment stationed outside the borders of the 
Russian Federation.  In Ukraine, despite appearances, the Russian Black Sea 
Fleet will maintain its status quo.  In Belarus and in Kyrgyzstan the Russians 
promise to open new bases, while in Georgia they have announced their intent to 
close two.  In part, these adjustments in Russia’s military footprint appear to be 
the Russian response to recent US and NATO military moves. 
 
WESTERN REGION 
Ukraine 
It seems highly unlikely that the fundamentals of Russia’s strong naval presence 
in Ukraine will change.  Even with the escalation of the Ukraine-NATO 
relationship, and even given the possibility that Ukraine might increase 
significantly the rent charged to the Russian navy in Sevastopol, the Russian 
military presence in Ukraine appears too valuable to jeopardize through any 
serious change.  
 
Clearly, Ukrainian membership in a western military alliance inexorably moves 
closer to reality.  Just last month Ukrainian First Deputy Foreign Minister Anton 
Buteiko reportedly promised that Ukraine soon will request NATO’s invitation to 
the alliance’s Membership Action Plan. (1)  Although long a NATO Partner 
country, Ukraine has accelerated its drive to achieve full-fledged membership 
over the past few years, a fact Buteiko confirmed when he further stated that 
Ukraine hoped to be a NATO member by 2008. (2)  This prospect of Ukraine in 
NATO perhaps has stifled the already contentious air surrounding Russia’s use 
of naval facilities and land in Ukraine. 
 
Already a source of conflict, the Black Sea Fleet accords, by which the Russian 
navy is based in Ukraine, again are under review.  The roots of the most recent 
problems ultimately can be traced to last December’s “gas war” between the two 
nations. (3)  Indeed, when Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Volodmyr Ohryzko 
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on 15 February, 2006 signaled Ukraine’s intent to use market principles in 
determining rent for the Russian navy in Crimea, Ukraine seemed to be paying 
back Russia for its role in December’s dispute over natural gas. (4)  Although 
both sides agreed to conduct an inventory of the Black Sea Fleet facilities and 
land, they also acknowledged that, regardless of the rent Ukraine decides to 
charge Russia and regardless of the amount Russia agrees to pay, the Russian 
navy is in Ukraine at least until 2017. (5) 
 
During the course of the next decade, Russia likely will use the Black Sea Fleet 
as one of the major resources with which to counter a burgeoning NATO.  
Among many strategic considerations, Russia’s fleet in Crimea constitutes the 
heart of the BlackSeaFor, a naval alliance formed by the riparian Black Sea 
states.  Although Russia ostensibly participates in NATO exercises like the 
Mediterranean-based Operation Active Endeavor, it uses the BlackSeaFor in part 
as a hedge against NATO’s naval expansion into the Black Sea. (6)  At the end 
of February, Russia confirmed this strategy by joining hands with Turkey to reject 
a US proposal to move Operation Active Endeavor into the Black Sea and then a 
few days later by launching Active Endeavor-like exercises of its own. (7)  
 
Belarus 
With “similar strategy” Russia will expand its military presence in Belarus and it 
will increase already robust air defenses in that country.  Russian Army General 
Vladimir Mikhailov, commander-in-chief of Russian Federation Armed Forces, 
confirmed the former during a visit to the Russian military base in Kant, 
Kyrgyzstan when he signaled Russia’s desire to acquire an air base in Belarus. 
(8)  In the same fashion that Russia might hope to use its presence in Ukraine as 
counter to NATO expansion in the Black Sea, so too can the Russians hope that 
opening an air base in Belarus will oppose NATO expansion in Eastern Europe. 
 
Belarus provides a nice buffer between the Russian Federation and NATO 
member (and soon-to-be-home of US military facilities), Poland.  Moreover, the 
 24 
Soviet-era military footprint is still fresh in Belarusian soil.  During the Cold War, 
Belarus was home to some of the largest deployments of Soviet military 
hardware, particularly aircraft and aircraft support facilities.  Today, much of that 
infrastructure and some of those aircraft remain in Belarus, although under the 
guise of Belarusian control.  
 
Russian military experts speculate that Russia will choose the existing facilities 
near the town of Baranovichi as the first choice for basing Russian fighters and 
strategic bombers in Belarus. (9)  Specifically, the aerodrome at Baranovichi is 
home to Aviation Repair Plant No. 558, which clearly seems to have the best 
capability for supporting the modern-day Russian Air Force. (10) 
 
Additionally, Russia already has moved some of its most capable air defense 
systems into western Belarus.  Two brigades of the formidable S-300 anti-aircraft 
missile system, NATO codenamed “S/A-10 Grumble,” and four battalions of the 
S-200 system, NATO codenamed “S/A-5 Gammon,” have been deployed to 
Belarus ostensibly to protect Russia’s western front from air strikes launched out 
of the Baltic States or Poland. (11)  Russia also has plans to deploy at least two 
more battalions of S-300s to Belarus. (12)  Together with the acquisition of an air 
base at Baranovichi for use by Russian fighters and strategic bombers, Russia’s 
deployment to Belarus of these robust missile systems constitutes a strong 
response to NATO and US encroachments in Eastern Europe. 
 
CAUCASUS REGION 
Georgia 
Given Russian reaction to the threat of the West’s encroachment into the Black 
Sea and Eastern Europe, Russia’s recent promise to close its military bases and 
remove its military hardware from Georgia seems counter-intuitive. Georgia’s 
repeated overtures to NATO would appear to reinforce Russia’s reticence to 
withdraw; Yet, the location of Georgia or, rather, the presence of Russian military 
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bases near Georgia, creates for Russia a set of strategic considerations entirely 
different from what it faces in Ukraine or Belarus. 
 
A shared northern border with Russia, a partially shared southern border with 
Armenia, and a western shore on the Black Sea put Georgia in the center of a 
triangle of Russian military bases and hardware.  Consequently, Russian bases 
and equipment in Georgia seem redundant.  Thus, after fits and starts over the 
past year, the Russian government reportedly signed a draft agreement that 
detailed and allocated funds for the closure of Russian military facilities in the 
Georgian towns of Akhalkalaki and Batumi. (13)  Russian President Vladimir 
Putin must still sign the plan, which reportedly lays out the following timeline: a 
31 December 2006 deadline for the evacuation of Russian military hardware in 
Akhalkalaki; the return to Georgia of the base in Akhalkalaki by 31 December 
2007; and, less specifically, sometime in 2008 the closure of the base at Batumi 
and the removal of Russian forces therein. (14)  
 
Batumi, on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, likely contributes little more to Russia’s 
strategic defense (or offense) than the Black Sea Fleet already provides.  
Moreover, Russia last year removed from Batumi a significant portion of the 
Russian military equipment there. (15)  Thus, by promising to close this sparsely-
equipped Russian base in a rather non-strategic location, Russia can lay claims 
to arms reduction at little military risk. 
 
The significance of Russia’s promise to close its military facilities in Akhalkalaki 
seems equally unimportant.  Akhalkalaki is located fewer than 40 kilometers from 
Armenia and fewer than 80 kilometers from Russia’s military base in the 
Armenian town of Gyurmi.  Armenia’s long military partnership with Russia, and 
the annual, large-scale military exercises between the two nations make the 
Russian presence in Akhalkalaki seem as redundant as the one in Batumi.  
Given this close military partnership between Russia and Armenia and given 
Akhalkalaki’s proximity to Armenia, it should come as little surprise if in 2006 and 
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2007 Russian military forces close shop in Akhalkalaki and re-open a mere 80 
kilometers away in Gyurmi. 
 
CENTRAL ASIA 
Kyrgyzstan 
NATO and US military involvement in Central Asia more closely resembles that 
in Eastern Europe than it does that in the Transcaucasus.  Not surprisingly, 
Russia has announced its intent, similar to that in Belarus, to expand the size of 
its military footprint in countries like Kyrgyzstan, where Russia already has a 
small presence at an air base near the town of Kant. 
 
On 16 February 2006, Russian Deputy Security Council Secretary Yuri Zubakov 
announced that the Russian Defense Ministry “is beginning to upgrade [the air 
base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan]” by as much as 150%. (16)  This Russian expansion in 
Kant stands in stark contrast to the situation in nearby Manas, where the US 
faces a 100-fold increase in the rent it pays for military operations that 
subsequently are threatened with extinction. (17)  Portending a similar 
juxtaposition between US and Russian military prospects is talk of Russian 
desires to open another base in the southern Kyrgyz town of Osh.  
 
There already has been public debate concerning the possibilities for Osh, 
located in the heart of Kyrgyzstan’s Ferghana Valley. (18)  Significantly, Osh is 
located much closer than is Kant to NATO and US operations in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan.  Osh also is close to the borders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, two 
countries where Russia would like to see its military presence blossom at the 
expense of the US and its allies.  Opening a base and stationing as many as 
1,000 Russian troops in Osh certainly would help Russia achieve this vision. (19) 
 
Conclusion 
It seems Russia is on the verge of making significant changes to its military 
posture around the world.  Moreover, as evidenced by recent adjustments to the 
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Russian military footprint in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan, Russia 
seems very concerned with countering the US and NATO presence near its 
borders.  If the past is a reliable guide then one should expect Russia to address 
its concerns by continuing to expand and adjust Russian military bases, 
equipment, and personnel stationed outside its borders. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) “Ukrainian President Asks for Invitation to NATO Summit,” AM, 17 Feb 06, 
RFE/RL Volume 10, Number 31, Part II. 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) For more on the “gas war” and the lighthouse row between Ukraine and 
Russia, see The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XII, No. 1, 27 Jan 06, Armed Forces: 
External by J.M. LeBlanc. 
(4) “Ukraine to Renegotiate Terms of Black Sea Fleet Presence According to 
Market Prices,” AM, 16 Feb 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 30, Part II. 
(5) Ibid. 
(6) For more on Russia and NATO’s Operation Active Endeavor, see The ISCIP 
Analyst, Vol. XI, No. 4, 08 Dec 05, Armed Forces: External by J.M. LeBlanc. 
(7) “Turkey Sides with Moscow Against Washington on Black Sea Force,” 
Torbakov, Igor, 3 Mar 06, Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM), Vol. 3, Issue 43. 
(8) “Russia Plans Belarus Air Base to Protect Against ‘Potential’ NATO Strike,” 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 1 Mar 06 via Johnson’s Russia List (JRL) 2006-#52. 
(9) Ibid. 
(10) www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/belarus/558arz.htm 
(11) “Russia Plans Belarus Air Base to Protect Against ‘Potential’ NATO Strike,” 
Ibid. 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) “Russia Approves Draft Agreement on Closure of Georgian Bases,” LF, 6 
Mar 06, RFE/RL Vol. 10, No. 41, Part I. 
 28 
(14) “Farewell to the Slavs: The last Russian troops will leave Georgia in 2008; 
An update on Russia's military bases in Georgia,” Gazeta, 3 Mar 06 via JRL 
2006-#54. 
(15) For more on Russia’s commitments to removing military equipment from 
Georgia in 2005, see The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XI, No. 3, 17 Nov 05, Armed 
Forces: External by J.M. LeBlanc. 
(16) “Kyrgyz: Russian, U.S. Military Bases on Opposite Tracks,” Pannier, Bruce, 
16 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org. 
(17) Ibid. 
(18) “Kyrgyz, Russian Officials Mull Military Base Possibility in Southern 
Kyrgyzstan,” Torbakov, Igor, 2 Jun 05 via www.Eurasianet.org. 
(19) Ibid. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Kate Martin 
 
CAUCASUS 
Countries reject human rights concerns 
The US Department of State issued its country reports on human rights practices 
this month, and the Caucasus region by and large received poor grades, 
although “some improvement” in Georgia and Armenia was noted.  The 
governments of Azerbaijan and Chechnya, however, essentially rejected the 
evaluations and criticisms.  Among the causes for concern in Azerbaijan, for 
instance, were the November 2005 parliamentary elections, which generated 
little applause among international observers.  But it is not simply the refusal of 
the Baku government to allow any opposition to have a voice.  The State 
Department also noted: “torture and beating of persons in custody, leading to 
four deaths; arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly of political opponents; 
harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; police impunity; lengthy pretrial 
detention; pervasive corruption in the judiciary” and other civil rights violations. 
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(1)  And, just in case opposition members take heart from the West’s attention, 
Azerbaijani President Ilkham Aliyev issued a warning that the “export of 
democracy does not work…. If this is our country it is up to us to decide how to 
live in it and how to develop it,” he said. (2)  Clearly he means the royal “us.” 
 
Then again, he could mean members of his government administration, who 
appear more than willing to justify last fall’s attacks on peaceful demonstrations 
in the capital.  Interior Minister Ramil Usubov said he disagreed with the State 
Department’s categorization of law enforcement actions as “violent dispersals.”  
“As the law invests the law enforcement agencies with the responsibility of 
maintaining law and order, appropriate actions against violators of order should 
be qualified as fitting the legal framework. Therefore it would be wrong to talk 
about the violation of the law of human rights in this case,” he said. (3)  Given the 
attitude that anything law enforcement agencies do to maintain order is justified, 
it is unlikely that international condemnation will have any corrective effect. 
 
Although there were some improvements in some areas, Armenia’s human rights 
record continued to be cause for concern.  Reported human rights problems 
included a “seriously flawed” referendum process; security force beatings of 
pretrial detainees; national security service and national police force impunity; 
arbitrary arrest and detention; [and] poor and unhealthy prison conditions,” as 
well as limitations on the rights to privacy, freedom of the press, and religious 
freedom. (4)   
 
In comparison to its neighbors in particular, Georgia got off somewhat lightly in 
the report.  The State Department mentioned the improvement in the Georgian 
government's human rights record, but noted continued problems in the quest for 
justice, including the torture, beating and abuse of detainees by law enforcement 
officers (although a reduction in this was noted, due to government actions); 
“inhumane and life-threatening prison conditions; corruption and impunity in law 
enforcement; arbitrary arrest and detention; [and] lack of judicial independence.”  
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Moreover, rights abuses in the breakaway republics of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia were noted: “deprivation of life, arbitrary arrest, and detention were 
problems.” (5) 
 
Elsewhere, “significant human rights problems,” particularly involving Chechnya, 
warranted special mention, including “alleged government involvement in 
politically motivated abductions, disappearances, and unlawful killing in 
Chechnya and elsewhere in the North Caucasus” and “widespread governmental 
and societal discrimination as well as racially motivated attacks against ethnic 
minorities.” Human rights abuses by anti-government forces also were noted, 
such as “killing and intimidating local heads of administration” and ”involvement 
in both terrorist bombings and politically motivated disappearances in Chechnya 
and Ingushetia during the year.” (6) 
 
Chechnya also heard from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour, who noted the atmosphere of fear created by the republic’s legal system.  
Arbour said she was concerned “by use of torture in obtaining confessions or 
information, and by threats against those who complain about officials,” (7)  
President Alu Alkhanov downplayed Arbour’s allegations.  “Torture and violence 
by interrogators take place all over the world.  Probably our rate is one or two 
percentage points above the average, due to the well-known events,” he said. (8) 
 
CHECHNYA 
Because he cares 
Last month’s announced suspension of Danish humanitarian organizations, 
according to then-acting Chechen Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov, was for their 
own good.  “After what they did with regard to the Prophet in that country, I am 
irritated by the very word Denmark.  Let them say that I’m acting incorrectly in 
legal terms…. But I will do everything to get these organizations out of 
Chechnya… I don’t rule out the possibility that members of Danish organizations 
could have been lynched….  So my decision might have been good for the 
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Danes themselves.  The Danes should even thank me,” Kadyrov explained.  (9)  
Later, however, Kadyrov had a change of heart; either that, or thank-you cards 
were pouring in from Copenhagen, an unlikely event.  On 27 February, he 
announced the Danish Refugee Council could resume operations in Chechnya. 
(10) 
 
GEORGIA 
Who’s sorry now? 
For a while it appeared as though the separatist movements in Georgia may 
have been the result of tensions exacerbated by a powerful neighbor interested 
in annexing as much “newly independent” territory as possible, while perhaps 
creating a destabilizing effect in Tbilisi.  But the leaders of these breakaway 
republics confirmed another, significant, motivation in the continuation of conflict 
both armed and verbal:  the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and, more 
particularly, Georgian aspirations for membership.  
 
Indeed, Abkhazia’s leadership – its self-proclaimed president, Sergei Bagapsh, 
as well as its vice president, parliamentary speaker, prime minister, and political 
party leaders – signed a statement asserting Abkhaz preparedness in the face of 
“Georgia’s possible military aggression.”  The evidence of that aggression: 
training in line with NATO standards, and an increase in Georgia’s military 
budget (a NATO requirement).  (11)   That training shows no sign of stopping: 
The chief of staff of Georgia’s armed forces, Levan Nikoleishvili, reported that 
currently Georgia has one infantry brigade that complies with NATO standards, a 
second getting close, and a third that will begin training in the summer. (12)  
Accession to NATO remains one of Georgia’s highest goals, and army training is 
seen as a critical part of the plan.  A recently released “Vision of priorities and 
goals for 2006” by the Georgian Defense Ministry includes the disbanding of the 
General Staff, to be replaced by the Joint Staff with officials from all branches of 
the military; as well as the development of an effective mobilization system and 
of 20 well-equipped and well-trained battalions. (13) 
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Instability within and near a country’s borders has slowed the process in the past, 
as the Baltic States’ situation demonstrated several years ago.  Georgia’s 
Minister of State for European Integration, Giorgi Baramidze, said hopefully that 
NATO entry should not depend on the settlement of internal conflicts, which 
several parties seem intent on inflaming.  “It is important for NATO to ensure that 
the process is dynamic and proceeds in the right direction,” he said, “NATO 
positively assesses our steps in this direction and does not demand that the 
conflicts should necessarily be settled immediately.” (14) 
 
Meanwhile, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili has backpedaled a bit as 
concerns the parliamentary resolution demanding the replacement of Russian 
peacekeepers by international (read: Western) units; that demand’s timeline, he 
said, was flexible, and “provides all parties, including Russia, with the chance to 
sit at the negotiating table and resolve the problems through negotiations.” (15)  
It would not be a stretch to assume that such a retreat from earlier rhetoric was 
prompted by telephone calls from the West. 
 
But if Tbilisi is being advised to ratchet down its stance, the other parties appear 
to be getting quite different advice.  South Ossetian leader Eduard Kokoity told 
Russian journalists that South Ossetia would react violently to the inclusion of 
Western forces in the conflict zone.  “[W]e will regard all other formations – under 
whatever aegis, except for the Russian peacekeepers – as aggressors and will 
eliminate them, anyone who comes here, except the Russian peacekeepers.  
These countries have no moral right to take any part in our peacekeeping 
process because, we all know very well, all of them are on Georgia’s side.  They 
are supporting Georgia militarily, they are arming Georgia, not with defensive 
weapons but with offensive weapons.”  (16)  Well, we can’t have the scales 
tipped, now, can we, particularly in the face of the quadripartite/bipartite Joint 
Control Commission, which pits Georgia against (nearly Russian) South Ossetia, 
(Russian) North Ossetia, and Russia. 
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Despite recent reports that Georgia plans to demilitarize the conflict zone in 
South Ossetia unilaterally, its opponents are clear they will not mirror that activity.  
“Abkhazia and South Ossetia cannot disarm unilaterally and create demilitarized 
zones while Georgia is ready to enter NATO. … Quite the contrary, we must do 
all to be able to parry adequately any aggression,” said Abkhazia’s “foreign 
minister,” Sergei Shamba. (17) 
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Kazakhstan Update: The lady doth protest too much! 
On December 4 last year, the Republic of Kazakhstan held its Presidential 
elections. During the course of the campaign, it became clear that President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev and his supporters had graduated from their normal 
intimidation tactics, including the destruction of campaign materials and verbal 
warnings regarding “illegal” campaigning, (1) to serious crimes such as murder 
and kidnapping. 
 
First, in early November, Yelena Nikitna, a campaign official for Nazarbaev’s 
most ‘serious’ challenger, Zarmakhan Tuyakbai, reported her daughter missing. 
Nikitna claimed that her daughter Oksanna had disappeared after her mother 
refused to cooperate with the authorities’ demands that she act as a mole inside 
Tuyakbai’s camp. (2) At the time of writing, Oksanna Nikitna apparently is still 
missing. 
 
On the weekend of 13 November, Zamanbek Nurkadilov, a former government 
minister and political ally of President Nazarbaev, was found dead at his home in 
Almaty. An Interior Ministry investigation into his death returned a suicide ruling, 
apparently due to the fact that Nurkadilov’s home showed no signs of forced 
entry. Given Nurkadilov’s wounds—two shots to the chest, one to the head—the 
‘suicide’ ruling was spurious at best. The Nurkadilov assassination also begged 
the question, “cui bono?”  In light of the fact that Nurkadilov possessed 
documents proving “massive corruption” (3) in the President’s family which he 
was threatening to release — it is likely that the assassination was ordered at the 
highest levels. 
 
A month ago, on 11 February, Altynbek Sarsenbayev, co-Chairman of the 
opposition Ak Zhol Party, and former Information Minister, was reported missing. 
Three days later, Sarsenbayev’s body, along with those of his driver and 
bodyguard, were found on the outskirts of Almaty. Although the Almaty police 
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force refused to confirm any details, Aydos Sarymov, an aide to Sarsenbayev 
stated that Sarsenbayev had been shot in the head twice, and been found with 
his hands bound behind his back. (4) 
 
On February 14, For a Just Kazakhstan, one of the country’s major opposition 
groups, held a press conference, during which Zharmakhan Tuyakbai spoke 
about the murder. Tuyakbai insisted that Sarsenbayev had been “neutralized” 
because of his “intellect and political talent,” and because he “might cause 
discomfort for the authorities.” (5)  
 
In comparison to the relative lack of publicity given to Nurkadilov’s murder last 
November, Sarsenbayev’s death has provided the government with a headache. 
Nurkadilvo’s ‘neutralization’ took place in an environment away from public 
view—namely his house—which the Security Services could easily insulate from 
the public, giving them time to cover their tracks, and provide an (albeit) thin layer 
of legality to the suicide ruling. Sarsenbayev’s murder was brutal, and apparently 
‘public.’ The manner of the discovery of his body leaves two possibilities open: 
Either his murder was intended as a harsh signal to the opposition, or the killers, 
for whatever reason, were forced to rush their job, not having time to complete 
the requisite cover-up operation. 
 
On 20 February, five days after Sarsenbayev’s funeral, Interior Minister Baurzhan 
Mukhamedjanov claimed that five suspects had been arrested and had 
confessed to the killing. (6) A day later, the KNB, Kazakhstan’s successor to the 
KGB, announced through its press service that the five men were members of 
the elite “Arystan” (equivalent to Russia’s Alpha Team) unit. (7) A sixth individual, 
Erzhan Utembaev, the Kazakh Senate’s chief of administration, was arrested and 
quickly, according to authorities, confessed to masterminding and ordering 
Sarsenbayev’s murder on the grounds of “long-lasting personal enmity.”(8) 
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If Utembaev is indeed the mastermind of Sarsenbayev’s murder, several 
questions arise, namely, who really controls the country’s Special Forces, and 
were the five killers acting on the orders of KNB Chief Nartai Dutbayev, or as part 
of a splinter group beyond his control? If the latter is the answer, then Nazarbaev 
does not control the Security Services, and is himself in danger from such a 
splinter group. Indeed, this is the line taken by the regime. 
 
In spite of the evidence suggesting simply the removal of a Presidential 
opponent, great pains have been taken to insist that Sarsenbayev’s murder was 
part of a greater plan to subvert the government and topple the President. The 
President’s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva has played a central role in making this 
case. First, on the same day Utembayev was arrested, Nazarbaeva (who was 
leader of the pro-Presidential Asar Party) called for the resignation of the KNB’s 
Chief (accepted a day later by the President), and the disbandment of Arystan. 
(9) Secondly, Nazarbaeva, in a statement issued on 23 February, claimed that 
Sarsenbayev’s murder constituted an “attempt at political assassination on the 
President…and a carefully and skillfully planned operation to discredit President 
Nursultan Nazarbaev and the entire existing system of state authority.” (10) 
Moreover, she insisted that the involvement of Special Forces troops suggested 
that “very influential forces” were behind the killing. Nazarbaeva’s last statement 
is ironic at best because she herself is not above suspicion. 
 
During the summer of 2005, Sarsenbayev made a number of serious allegations, 
including corruption, against Nazarbaeva, claiming that the violations occurred 
during her purchase of Khabar, the country’s most powerful media group.  
Nazarbaeva sued, and Sarsenbayev was ordered to pay a fine for slandering the 
company. (11) As such, the two were enemies. The allegations against 
Nazarbaeva over Sarsenbayev’s death apparently have become so multiple and 
vocal, that she has threatened legal action against the publishers of such 
“libelous reports” no matter where they are published. (12) Events in the last 
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week suggest that the Kazakh government is intent on pursuing its ‘coup’ story—
probably because it has no other choice.  
 
On 10 March, Nazarbaeva launched a further, escalated attack on the Security 
Services, claiming that they were, as a whole, in league with the opposition, and 
were launching an “information war” against the President’s family. (13) During 
the same interview, Nazarbaeva (quite possibly by mistake) claimed that during 
his meeting with the President, KNB Chief Dutbayev told Nazarbaev that a 
member of his family had ordered the assassination without revealing who the 
guilty party was. (14) Dutbayev likely was forced to resign for two reasons: firstly 
as ‘punishment’ for the botched assassination attempt, but most importantly, to 
discredit any future attempt by Dutbayev to ‘go public’ with his information by 
placing responsibility for the murder squarely on the shoulders of ‘rogue’ 
elements of the KNB. At this point, it seems safe to conclude that Utembayev’s 
arrest is designed to provide the government with a ‘patsy’ to take the fall for the 
murder, and that Nazarbaeva’s ever more frantic accusations constitute a classic 
example of “the lady doth protest too much.” 
 
Uzbekistan update: Hefty prison sentences for opposition leadership 
Last fall, in what was a direct result of the events in Andijan, the Uzbek 
government launched a concerted campaign against one of the nation’s major 
opposition groups, the Sunshine Coalition. On 22 October, the National Security 
Service arrested Sanjar Umarov, the movements’ leader. Until his arrest, Umarov 
was one of President Islam Karimov’s most vocal critics, issuing a number of 
calls for the dissolution of the government, and for far-reaching democratic 
reforms. Umarov also had issued what amounted to a direct challenge to the 
President, when he announced his intention to run against Karimov in the 2007 
election. (15) A number of weeks after Umarov’s arrest, Uzbek Security Forces 
arrested the Sunshine Coalition’s “coordinator,” Nodira Khidoyatova, when she 
arrived in Tashkent after a trip to Moscow. 
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Several days after their separate trials began, the Uzbek Prosecutor’s office 
issued a statement insisting that “Sanjar Umarov and his criminal group” were 
being tried for economic rather than political crimes. (16) Specific charges 
against Umarov and Khidoyatova included embezzlement, tax evasion and fraud. 
In light of the Sunshine Coalition’s political activities, the Prosecutor’s statement 
could not be taken at face value. The financial charges were probably used to 
avoid allegations of ‘undemocratic’ activity being leveled against the Karimov 
government. 
 
On March 1 and 6, the judges in the respective cases reached verdicts, with 
Khidoyatova receiving a 10 year prison sentence, while Umarov was sentenced 
to 14½ years (which was reduced by a fourth under the recent amnesty law). (17) 
Delivering his verdict, Judge Zorkirjon Isaev stated that Umarov “headed an 
organized criminal group,” which had successfully conspired to inflict “large 
economic losses to the interests of Uzbekistan.” (18) 
 
Both Umarov’s and Khidoyatova’s lawyers have announced their intention to 
appeal the verdicts, but it should be stated that attempts to overturn the 
convictions will likely be unsuccessful, given the current atmosphere in 
Uzbekistan. Although there has been no indication of such moves so far, it is 
possible that the Uzbek government will allow the two to leave the country as 
exiles, in order to appear “humanitarian.” What is certain is that the Uzbek 
government will continue its anti-opposition activities in order to ‘clear the decks’ 
ahead of next year’s Presidential election. 
 
Source Notes: 
 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XII, Number 1 (27 Jan 06). 
(2) Ibid. 
(3) Ibid. 
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(4) “Kazakhstan: Opposition Figure Found Shot Dead Near Almaty,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 13 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/0C2B8F56-
79F6-447A-B66F-5E41C199689A.html . 
(5) “Kazakhstan: Opposition Blames Regime For Sarsenbayev’s Death,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 14 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/EA8E714F-
FDD2-490F-8CED-1A0E2E416AAC.html . 
(6) “Kazakhstan: Authorities Say Suspects Confess to Killing,” RFE/RL Features 
Article, 20 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/C576BFDB-D712-
4AF3-9C79-DA24B9C1C020.html . 
(7) ITAR-TASS, 21 Feb 06; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(8) “Kazakhstan: Authorities Insist Personal Enmity Behind Sarsenbayev’s 
Murder,” RFE/RL Features Article, 27 Feb 06 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/8DF99385-2D18-4943-9017-
D0811CCE6FD8.html . 
(9) “Kazakhstan: Opposition Figure Found Shot Dead Near Almaty,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 13 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/0C2B8F56-
79F6-447A-B66F-5E41C199689A.html . 
(10) “Kazakh President’s Daughter Urges Security Head To Quit,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 22 Feb 06 via www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/2/A712CAC4-
94EC-4905-A698-043695B6E6BA.html . 
(11) Eurasia Insight, 05 March 06 via 
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp030506.shtml . 
(12) Ibid. 
(13) Interfax-Kazakhstan News Agency, 1 March 2006; BBC Monitoring via 
www.search.ft.com/searchArticle?id=060301008911&query=Nazarbayeva&vsc_
appId=totalSearch&offset=0&resultsToShow=10&vsc_subjectConcept=&vsc_co
mpanyConcept=&state=More&vsc_publicationGroups=TOPW&searchCat=1 . 
(14) AP Worldstream, 10 March 2006 via 
www.search.ft.com/searchArticle?id=060310005211&query=Nazarbayeva&vsc_
appId=totalSearch&offset=0&resultsToShow=10&vsc_subjectConcept=&vsc_co
mpanyConcept=&state=More&vsc_publicationGroups=TOPW&searchCat=1 . 
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(16) Ibid. 
(17) “Uzbekistan: Another Opposition leader Given Harsh Sentence,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 06 March 2006 via 
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/3/4762E14C-2EF7-4A99-ABB1-
037F8B9817D7.html . 
(18) “Uzbek Opposition leader Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison,” RFE/RL 
Features Article, 06 March 2006 via 
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UKRAINE 
Freedom of Choice 
The election campaign of 2006 
In the Orange Revolution of 2004, Ukrainian citizens rose up to demand justice 
and truth: They demanded that an overtly rigged presidential election be 
overturned and their opinions counted. And they won. This year, as Ukrainians 
prepare to vote in the first parliamentary election since their revolution, they do 
so in a new atmosphere of freedom and fairness. While many voters may be 
disappointed that, following the revolution, change didn’t come as quickly as they 
anticipated in a number of areas, the parliamentary campaign of 2006 clearly 
demonstrates the impressive level of political freedom and debate that has 
blossomed in Ukraine in just over one year. 
 
In 2004, then-presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko was refused time to 
advertise or appear on the primarily state-controlled Ukrainian media. He was 
routinely attacked by “journalists,” as numerous dubious, intensely negative 
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“documentaries” appeared all over Ukraine’s television channels. At the same 
time, Yushchenko was refused permits to hold rallies, denied airplane landing 
rights to campaign in certain regions, followed by security service personnel, 
threatened, and finally, poisoned. 
 
Those supporting Yushchenko were bullied, subjected to “investigations” by tax 
and police officials, followed, and, along with Yushchenko, placed under a 
constant state of siege. Media found to be critical of the administration in power 
simply were shut down, journalists were threatened (threats which were taken 
seriously given the earlier murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze and the 
disappearances of several others), and an atmosphere of oppression prevailed 
against those not supportive of the regime in power. 
 
Alternatively, Yushchenko’s opponent, then-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich – 
the chosen successor of President Leonid Kuchma – was praised at every turn 
on Ukrainian television and radio, and in state controlled newspapers. Certain 
journalists were rewarded for their support of Yanukovich, as most news 
distribution followed restrictive orders issued directly from the presidential 
administration (there were, of course, brave exceptions). Yanukovich received 
massive assistance from the state apparatus in holding rallies and “contacting” 
voters, state workers were threatened with the loss of jobs if they did not vote for 
him, and students were told they would lose their stipends and housing. 
Moreover, this assistance continued throughout the now-discredited first round of 
voting. 
 
My, how things have changed.   
 
In 2006, advertisements for parties taking part in the parliamentary elections – 
even those overtly opposing President Yushchenko – appear regularly on all 
media outlets without restriction. Candidates travel, hold rallies and appear on 
media talk programs without problem or constraint. Although some candidates 
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have complained of obstruction by officials at the local and regional level, 
complaints are aired loudly, and generally, problems are corrected. Even in 
Donetsk, the region of the country with the highest level of election fraud and 
violence in 2004, and the region where officials still cling to many of the old ways, 
candidates from all parties are allowed – if not welcomed – to campaign and 
speak to the press. 
 
During one week on Ukrainian television, viewers could watch hour-long press 
conferences with former revolution leader and prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko, 
who is running separately from Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine party in these 
elections, Socialist Party leader and former Orange Revolution partner Oleksandr 
Moroz, and Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov, the political leader of Our Ukraine. 
Additionally, they could see lengthy interviews with the leaders of the smaller 
PORA and Viche parties, a political debate on possible parliamentary coalitions, 
regular news reports on the activities of all parties, and enough political 
advertising to irritate even seasoned Western political analysts. 
 
In fact, so many parties have bought advertising (47 are running) that state-
controlled Channel 1 is running at least five minute-long blocs of political 
advertising several times each hour. Cursory observation suggests that 
Yanukovich’s Party of Regions has purchased the largest amount of advertising 
time, and unlike what happened to candidate Yushchenko in 2004, all channels 
are running these advertisements. 
 
On Independence Square, the site of the largest Orange Revolution protests in 
2004, all parties can, and often do, maintain booths to distribute campaign 
material, and on weekends, set up small soundstages to conduct rallies. There is 
no greater sign of the new freedom in the country than the fact that on 11 March, 
Yanukovich’s Party of Regions held a rally for hundreds of voters almost on the 
same site where hundreds of thousands protested against him slightly more than 
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one year earlier. The rally was not obstructed, not watched by security personnel 
videotaping attendees, and not barred from coverage by the media. 
 
This is particularly impressive given that Yanukovich seems poised to win the 
greatest number of seats in the next parliament (25-30%). President Yushchenko 
and those around him have not responded as most leaders of the former Soviet 
Republics have done when faced with similar political challenges, rather they 
simply have campaigned harder, and challenged Yanukovich to debates. They 
have accepted that – as during the third round of the 2004 presidential election 
when Yanukovich received 44% of the votes – there is a portion of the citizenry 
that supports the former Prime Minister’s pro-Russia, anti-NATO program. In 
other words, they have responded as any Western political party would do. 
 
There are, of course, individuals within Our Ukraine who have suggested that 
Yanukovich should not be allowed to run in this election, because past crimes 
committed in his youth and his alleged involvement in 2004’s election fraud 
should disqualify him. Yushchenko, however, has shied away from this idea, as 
he has shied away from pursuing Kuchma for his past alleged crimes (including 
alleged involvement in the murder of Gongadze). For better or for worse, 
Yushchenko has chosen to allow his opponents to rehabilitate themselves. 
Perhaps this is not the justice demanded during the orange revolution, but it is 
freedom – and a level of freedom unknown in that part of the world. 
 
It is also worth highlighting that President Yushchenko and Our Ukraine face 
challenges not only from Yanukovich but from his former revolution partner, Yulia 
Tymoshenko. A poll released on 10 March by the respected Democratic 
Initiatives Foundation found Yanukovich with 30.4%, Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine 
Bloc at 17.1% and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc with 16.9% of voter support. 
Yushchenko’s decision to break from Soviet and post-Soviet electioneering 
practices has allowed his party to face the possibility of placing third in the 
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election, but should also prove to his citizens – and the West – that it is possible 
to hold a fair and free election in the former Soviet region. 
 
Problems faced on election day 
The poll itself will present additional problems for the government, as the country 
implements new laws and procedures designed to limit fraud and increase 
accountability. Most observers agree with the government’s own assessment that 
the sheer volume of choices faced by voters will mean long lines and an 
exceptionally long vote counting period. The national parliamentary ballot will 
have 47 party choices and be so long that it will not fit on the table provided to 
mark it. Moreover, voters could receive up to an additional four ballots, as they 
vote simultaneously for the first time in regional, municipal, district and local 
elections. Parties on each ballot may be different and in a different order than on 
the national parliamentary ballot. Needless to say, voters will have more choice 
than they thought possible in 2004, and election workers who likely have never 
participated in a free election will face counting challenges. 
 
There is little worry, however, of vote tampering or rigging. Yushchenko’s 
message of non-interference seems to have been clearly delivered to election 
workers. These workers complain that they are afraid to make mistakes for fear 
of being charged with fraud. This fear has contributed to difficulty filling election 
positions throughout the country, but it speaks volumes about the tone being set 
by the presidential administration. 
 
Coalition building 
Whether the pluralism of a campaign can be carried over into a pluralistic, 
diverse, and inclusive government also is a major test for this new Western-
oriented government. 
 
The incoming parliament will be tasked by new constitutional amendments with 
creating a majority coalition and choosing a prime minister and cabinet. 
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Previously, the president named the prime minister, who was then confirmed by 
parliament. Now, the country has moved in the direction of a parliamentary 
republic (although the president will maintain more power than most presidents 
possess under this form of government). 
 
Numerous majority coalition scenarios exist, including agreements between 
Yanukovich and Yushchenko and between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. 
Should the parliament fail to reach a majority coalition agreement within 30 days 
after opening its session, the president has the right to disband the body and call 
new elections. It is unclear whether this is a scenario being considered by 
Yushchenko, but it is hard to believe that the president would embrace this idea 
over a coalition with his former partners, especially following a difficult campaign, 
having made such progress on political freedom and with such unpredictable 
consequences. 
 
It is also hard to believe that Yushchenko would choose to unite with former 
Prime Minister Yanukovich, the man who was complicit in the oppression of him 
and his associates in 2004. Even more, Yanukovich leads a party that voted in 
2005 to oppose joining NATO, oppose reforms needed to join the WTO, oppose 
joining the EU without a special agreement with Russia, and oppose anti-
monopoly free-market reforms that might have threatened the control some party 
members hold in certain industries. Clearly, Yushchenko has many decisions to 
make in the next month or two. 
 
Also clearly, Ukraine has come far in slightly over one year. The atmosphere on 
the streets is cautious but hopeful, and the campaign resembles some of the 
most hotly contested in the West. For over one year, Viktor Yushchenko has said 
that his country is part of Europe. And there can be no doubt that the president 
has given Ukrainians two of their most important demands during the revolution, 
and two of the fundamental rights of European nations – the freedom to choose 
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their own political leaders and the freedom to learn about them from an 
uncensored press. 
 
BELARUS 
Terror in the heart of Europe 
On 19 March, Belarusians will “vote” in what President Aleksandr Lukashenko is 
calling an election. But, there should be no mistake, the actions of the 
Lukashenko regime make it clear that the poll taking place in Belarus resembles 
nothing close to a real election. 
 
Opponents of Lukashenko are regularly harassed; they are not allowed to hold 
rallies; they are investigated by police; they are beaten; and they are arrested. 
The media is entirely censored, election observers are arrested or deported. The 
atmosphere provides no choice – except that imposed by the government. 
 
For example: 
 
-- On 15 March, Anatoly Lebedko, the head of opposition candidate Aleksandr 
Milinkevich's election campaign and a prominent activist, was arrested by 
Belarusian authorities. 
 
-- On 2 March, opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr Kozulin was violently 
arrested when he tried to attend a congress being held by President Lukashenko. 
While trying to record his arrest for broadcast, a Reuters television correspondent 
was beaten. A dozen reporters were arrested later near the police station where 
Kozulin was being held; in the process, Oleg Ulevich, a Komsomolskaya pravda 
correspondent based in Belarus, was hospitalized with a concussion and a 
broken nose. 
 
Kozulin and the reporters were released after several hours detention. Kozulin, 
however, was suffering from a concussion and had noticeable bruising (1) 
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-- Also on 2 March, Siarhei Liashkevich, head of the Shchuchyn city campaign 
office of opposition presidential candidate Aleksandr Milinkevich was arrested. 
Police searched Liashkevich’s apartment, and confiscated all computers and 
documents. Authorities say he could face up to three years in jail for “preparation 
of a mass riot.” (2) 
 
-- On 9 March, Vinstuk Vyachorka, the deputy head of Milinkevich’s campaign 
and the man tasked with outreach to the international community, was sentenced 
to 15 days in jail for “organizing an illegal rally.” He was arrested following a 
campaign appearance by Melinkevich, at which 1,000 people reportedly 
gathered. (3) 
 
In court, Vyachorka was defiant, despite reportedly rough treatment by police 
(fellow party members who tried to contact him on his mobile phone directly after 
his arrest said he answered but then they heard nothing but scuffling and yelling 
by police). He said, “There are no legal possibilities left for us to continue our 
work in the future. We need to learn to live as dissidents in Cuba -- prepare 
ourselves for more serious, more basic forms of struggle.” Along with Vyachorka, 
two other Melinkevich activists were jailed. (4) 
 
-- On 21 February, authorities raided a meeting of the Belarusian election 
monitoring and civic advocacy organization Partnership. The group had intended 
to monitor the presidential election for irregularities, as it had previous elections 
in Belarus and throughout the former Soviet region. Four members of the group, 
including its leader, were arrested and remain in custody without trial under a 
charge of holding “an illegal meeting.” 
 
Because the group received training in election observation from US-based 
NGOs, the Belarusian KGB (yes, it is still proudly called this), also charged that 
the organization was fomenting revolution on behalf of the United States. In 
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statements at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington 
DC, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried 
called these accusations “fanciful and frankly absurd,” adding, “This is Soviet-
style in its absurdity.” (5) 
 
-- On 14 March, authorities deported a group of Danish and Swedish election 
monitors. (6) 
 
-- Also, on 14 March, authorities arrested a journalist for Ukraine's TV 5 Kanal, 
who was literally in the midst of a live telephone broadcast as she was physically 
grabbed by police. During her broadcast, which was carried on all major 
Ukrainian news stations following her arrest, Hanna Gorozhenko can be heard 
screaming that the police were attempting to enter the vehicle from which she 
was broadcasting. Shortly thereafter, a scuffle is heard and the phone cuts off. 
Gorozhenko remains in custody, and another TV 5 Kanal crew that tried to enter 
Belarus was turned back at the border. (7) 
 
-- On 13 March, three Ukrainian student activists were sentenced to ten days in 
Belarusian prison after attending what authorities called an “illegal rally.” (8) 
 
-- On March 1, the Deputy Head of Melinkevich’s Hrodna city campaign, Vadzim 
Saranchukou, was arrested for “petty hooliganism” He was kept in custody for 
five days and then released on 6 March. Melinkevich’s representatives suggest 
he was arrested to undermine a planned meeting of Melinkevich with voters in 
Hrodna on 4 March. (9) 
 
-- On 7 March, a town court in Mahilyou sentenced Melinkevich’s regional 
campaign manager Uladzimir Shantsau to fifteen days in jail for “holding an 
unsanctioned rally.” However, Shantsau was forced to hold the rally outdoors, 
after the hall where he had been sanctioned to hold the event was suddenly 
unavailable to him. The same court fined Milinkevich ally Anatol Lyabedzka $750 
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for the same offense. Although Lyabedzka had permission from authorities to 
hold the rally inside the local university, at the last moment, he was not allowed 
inside – forcing him outside and in technical violation of the law. (10) 
 
-- As authorities cracked down on current opposition leaders, last week, former 
parliamentary deputy and opposition activist Sergei Skrebets, who has served 
approximately one year of a 2.5-year prison sentence, was transferred to the 
hospital because of the “deterioration of his health.” Skrebets used his position 
as a deputy to oppose Lukashenko for four years before his arrest. He is but one 
of over a dozen opposition politicians and journalists who have disappeared, 
mysteriously died or been imprisoned in the last several years. 
 
Given the attacks on Belarusian opposition candidates, campaigners, journalists 
and observers, it is clear that the election cannot be deemed either free or fair. 
This is underscored by violations already reported during the “early voting” 
period, which began on 15 March. While this period is said to allow voters who 
cannot do so on election day to cast their ballots, it also provides the opportunity 
for voters to cast their ballot repeatedly over many days. 
 
So, what will the US or the EU do about it?  Following Vyachorka’s arrest, 
Senator Sam Brownback, Chairman of the US Congressional Helsinki 
Commission, which is one of the most outspoken and consistent critics of 
Lukashenko, said, “Authorities that engage in attempts at intimidation, electoral 
abuse or violence will face repercussions from the international community.” (11) 
Additionally, US Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs at 
the State Department David Kramer recently suggested that Belarus “should not 
underestimate the reaction of the US government” to election rigging and 
violence against protesters. (12) 
 
However, Belarus already is isolated, with various sanctions in place against it 
and travel bans on most of its leaders. It appears unlikely that further negative 
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remarks, threats or sanctions from Western governments will sway Lukashenko, 
especially since he receives considerable support from his partner, Russia. For 
every criticism levied at Belarus and Lukashenko, Russia responds with support. 
Just a week ago, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov arrived in Belarus to 
meet with Lukashenko. His visit, like the earlier visit of Vladimir Putin, must have 
given the Belarusian president comfort as he faces Western condemnation. 
 
Belarus also avoids the negative economic effects of its isolation thanks to 
massive Russian subsidies of oil, gas and food products, among other 
categories.  
 
Most important, last year, the Bratislava-based Pontis Foundation completed an 
examination of Belarus’ energy market in relation to its economy, and found that 
Belarusian authorities and government-owned businesses make considerable 
profits by importing Russian oil into Belarus at bargain prices and then exporting 
it to the EU at market – or just below market – prices. These contracts with the 
EU are reportedly worth up to 3.3 billion euros each year and allow Lukashenko 
to maintain his country at a minimum subsistence level. Russia's agreement to 
maintain Belarusian gas and oil prices at between 40 to 50 dollars per cubic 
meter (as opposed to, for example, the $230 the country charges Ukraine), is the 
main reason that Lukashenko can maintain power and avoid the economic 
reforms that would bring his country closer to Western standards. 
 
Therefore, significant and consistent pressure on Russia to end its support for 
Lukashenko could drastically improve the lives of Belarusians and end the reign 
of terror of the Belarusian president. 
 
The Pontis Foundation also suggested that in order to impact Lukashenko’s 
actions, oil exports from Belarus to the EU should be frozen. This, the Pontis 
Foundation said, “could strike a direct blow against the Minsk government by 
blocking oil exports from Belarus.” (13) 
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A freezing of oil exports, or at least a pegging of the price to that paid by Belarus 
to Russia, likely would be welcomed by Poland, as well as Lithuania, which has 
worked steadfastly to support independent media in Belarus. Additionally, 
Ukraine has signaled its willingness to support such an initiative by joining all 
recent EU statements criticizing Belarus. 
 
Without this or similar action, threats against Lukashenko show little chance of 
having an effect. The “last dictator in Europe” has shown little fear of the West, 
and has been protected by Russia in the East. Only a strike at the funds that 
allow him to maintain his hold on the country – and the lifestyle he enjoys – 
seems likely to have any possibility of success. 
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